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International Application of American
Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals
James A. Rahl*
American antitrust policy in foreign commerce is once again under
the pressure of complaints from at home and abroad.' It may seem
anomalous that laws intended to protect competition are charged with
impairing American "competitiveness," but that is the contention
heard in Congress and in business quarters.2 Meanwhile, some foreign
nations, including a few who have recently enacted new antitrust laws
of their own, complain that our antitrust laws are too aggressive.
3
Given the large amount of current discussion and the number of
different proposals in Congress, careful study of the issues and of possi-
ble solutions is certainly indicated.4 Antitrust policy is fundamental to
* Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
I A bill to create a national commission to study the issues, S. 1010, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126
CONG. REC. S13,814-15 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (sponsored by Sen. Mathias and others), has
passed the Senate at this writing. It and a companion bill, H.R. 7550 (sponsored by Rep. Mc-
Clory), are pending in the House. See To Establish a Commission on The International Application
of Antitrust Laws: Hearings on S, 1010 Before the Senate Comm on Governmental Affairs, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as S. 1010 Hearings]; PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (Griffin ed. 1979) (publication
of the A.B.A. International Law Section) [hereinafter cited as PERSPECTIVES]; Hacking, The In-
creasing Extraterritorial Impact of US. Laws: A Causefor Concern Amongst Friends ofAmerica, 1
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979).
2 See S. 1010 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Senator Mathias); id at 1-6
(statement of Senator Javits); Foreign Interests Seek to Curb Extraterritorial Application of Sher-
man Act, 966 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-6 (May 29, 1980); ANTITRUST TASK
FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT ON U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND AMERICAN EXPORTS (Feb. 26,
1974), reprinted in International.4spects ofAntitrust Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 4nti-
trust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 163 (1973-
1974).3 See Silkin, The Persective ofthe Attorney General ofEnglandand Wales, in PERSPECTIVES,
supra note I, at 28; 966 ANTITRUST TRADE REo. REP. (BNA), supra note 2, at A-6.
4 I testified in favor of S. 1010. S 1010 Hearings, supra note 1, at 92-106.
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American private enterprise capitalism, and any study which fails to
appreciate that may easily go astray. At the same time, there are
problems of possible business injury from some applications of the law
which deserve consideration, and there are international problems of
good relations with other countries and of frustration of our antitrust
policies which ought to be addressed.
Under the circumstances, the subjects to be studied must be care-
fully chosen, and the methods of study should be as enlightened as
possible. Topics to be examined might be approached under the fol-
lowing three broad headings, discussed below:
(1) Rules of law and their extraterritorial application.
(2) Benefits and injuries from antitrust policy.
(3) Laws and policies of foreign governments, both consistent with and
in conflict with antitrust.
Some methods of approaching these topics are suggested to sup-
plement traditional testimonial techniques.
RULES OF LAW AND THEIR EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
A study should begin with some analysis of legal principles gov-
erning international application of American antitrust laws, particu-
larly those which give rise to problems. Foremost among the problems
are the "extraterritorial" issues, falling into three categories: (a) the
"effects" doctrine, of applicability to activities abroad which affect
American commerce; (b) conversely, the "foreign markets" issue, of ap-
plicability to activities at home whose chief effects are abroad; and (c)
discovery and enforcement procedures of American antitrust abroad.
A fourth set of problems involves the actual substantive antitrust rules
applied to foreign commerce, especially the issue of per se vs. reasona-
bleness tests. These questions have been discussed extensively in writ-
ings, hearings, and other forums, and examination of the best of the
large literature on the subject should be part of the study.5
The Extraterritoriality Issues
The following example will illustrate the effects doctrine, the for-
eign markets question and procedural problems of extraterritoriality.
5 To avoid over-extending this article and to concentrate on the issues themselves, I have
refrained from including references to most of the many excellent writings which one should con-
suit in this field. For extensive bibliographies, see B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 16-18 (1979); COMMON MARKET AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT 54-56 n.13 (J. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Rahl]; W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 577-93 (2d ed. 1973).
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Suppose that several private British firms together control the en-
tire free world supply of a commodity produced in England which is of
vital importance to the American economy. Meeting in London, these
firms take a page from the OPEC book and double the price in exports
to the United States, though not at home, knowing that the effect will
be drastic and on a par with the recent oil price increases.
Assume that diplomatic appeals will be unavailing. The United
Kingdom has enacted several antitrust-type statutes since World War
II,6 but the most immediately relevant of these, the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act, 1976, provides for exemption of export cartels.7 It, like
the antitrust laws of most other nations,8 would not be given a "foreign
markets" applicability in a case like this unless there were domestic
effects as well.
How may American law approach this situation? The cartel's ac-
tivities are mainly abroad, but they reach our shores in the form of
restrictive effect on our imports and thence on our domestic prices.
This is then a combination in restraint of trade which is carried out in
our foreign import commerce and which also affects our domestic inter-
state commerce. As a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the Sher-
man Act,9 not to mention the Wilson Tariff Act," clearly applies, " and
as a matter of substantive law, the Act plainly would make this private
price-fixing combination illegal. Under the Alcoa decision,' 2 U.S. law
may and does prohibit this foreign combination because it is intended
to affect U.S. imports and domestic commerce, and it actually has that
effect. Using a slightly more liberal test in recognizing jurisdiction,
Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of
6 U.K. statutes up to 1980 are printed in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, 3 GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1978) (loose-
leaf) [hereinafter cited as "OECD GUIDE"]. In addition, Parliament has enacted the Competition
Act, 1980, c. 21.
7 The U.K. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, c. 34, schedule 3, 1 6(l)(a) states that the
Act does not apply to an agreement in which all the restrictions relate exclusively "to the supply of
goods by export from the United Kingdom."
8 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPORT CARTELS:
REPORT OF THE OECD COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 7-8, 22
(1974). Article 85(1) of the European Common Market's Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, does not reach export restraints unless they also have some effect on competition
within the Common Market and on interstate trade.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
10 The Wilson Tariff Act, §§ 73-77, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976), prohibits restraints of trade in
imports, but adds almost nothing significant to the Sherman Act's broader coverage.
I HAWK, supra note 5, at 104.
12 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the United States supports this conclusion.' 3
There are several doctrines which, given special facts, could affect
applicability of the Act. If the British Government required the firms
to raise their prices, a defense of "foreign government compulsion"
could arise, and there could be an "act of state" defense also if an
American suit sought to question the acts of the British Government. 14
Even in the absence of foreign compulsion, if British public policy
strongly supported the cartel for some reason, this might be taken into
account as a matter of "comity," under recent federal court of appeals
decisions.15 On the facts given, however, Sherman Act applicability
seems clear.
Strangely, the Department of Justice might decide not to prosecute
despite the apparently clear violation, if it follows a policy stated in
1977. In a letter to Senator Kennedy as chairman of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, the then head of the Antitrust Division, Donald Baker,
indicated that the Division did not proceed against foreign export car-
tels if they were of a kind allowed to American exporters under the
Webb-Pomerene Act. 6 A later head of the Division, John Shenefield,
however, indicated the following year that this might change.
17
In order to proceed, American suits might face difficulties in ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over the British firms in an American
court.'" An equally difficult practical problem of obtaining evidence
might arise if necessary witnesses and documents are in England. 19
Moreover, any remedy against the cartel might be rendered ineffective
by the foreign location of the parties and the activity.20
At each step of the way, American action would be likely to en-
13 Section 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965) states that a nation has jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory causing an
effect within the territory, inter a/ia, if the effect occurs "as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct." § 18(b)(iii). The Alcoa case's intent requirement is thus replaced by a foreseeability
test.
14 See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 115-18 infra.
16 See HAwK, supra note 5, at 104-106. The Webb-Pomerene Act is 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65
(1976).
17 HAWK, supra note 5, at 106.
18 See id at 59-70; FUGATE, supra note 5 at 87-114; Rahl, supra note 5, at 131-35.
19 HAwK, supra note 5, at 314-43; see Lever, Aspects of Jurisdictonal Conflict in the Field of
Discovery, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, FIFrH ANNUAL FoRDHAm LAW INSTITUTE 358 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FInrH FoRDHAm ANTTrUST]; Flexner, Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust
Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mechanisms, in id at 380; RaM, Enforcement and Discovery Con-
flicts: A View from the United States, in id 347-55; General Enforcement Policy in International
Trade, in id at 328 (panel discussion with Bertrand, Davidow, Haight and Stockmann); FUGATE,
supra note 5, at 114; Rahl, supra note 5, at 118.
20 HAWK, supra note 5, at 344-64; FUGATE, supra note 5, at 128; Rahl, supra note 5, at 118.
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counter British Government objection and interference. The British
object to the effects doctrine as a matter of substantive law on the
ground that it is an effort by the United States to enforce an economic
regulation in the United Kingdom, contrary to British sovereignty and
international law.21 Even if substantive applicability were clear-as it
would be if all of the activity occurred in the United States-the British
probably would still object to procedural activities in the United King-
dom in aid of American antitrust enforcement.22 The recently enacted
U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act could be used to prevent the
taking of evidence from the U.K. in aid of the American proceeding.23
If the voluntary aid of British courts were sought through letters roga-
tory, this too would probably encounter objections.24 A U.S. court in-
junction against the cartel would certainly be ineffective in England.25
And if a party obtained a treble damage judgment against the cartel, as
might well occur, the new U.K. Act permits the defendants to sue in
England to recover the punitive portion of the damages.26
In the example given, both substantive and procedural problems
may occur, but procedural extraterritoriality may be a problem even if
subject-matter jurisdiction is beyond question. Conversely, it is possi-
ble to have personal jurisdiction and evidence available, but have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in question because the activity is outside the
United States.
At various times, other nations have protested American antitrust
actions on grounds of extraterritoriality, and a few have enacted
"blocking" statutes to prevent obtaining of evidence.27 On the other
21 See Silkin, The Perspective fthe Attorney General of England and Wales, in PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 1, at 28; Willoughby, Remarks ofan English Solicitor, in id at 56.
22 See FIFTH FoRDHAM INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 358; Rahl, id at 343; Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
23 1980, c. 11, reprinted in 959 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at F-I (Apr. 10, 1980).
Section 2 authorizes the Secretary of State to prohibit compliance with foreign orders to a person
in the United Kingdom to produce evidence not located within the territory of the foreign country.
See Comment, The British Protection 0/Trading Interests Act of1980: Britain's Response to U.S.
ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980).
24 See Lever, in FIFTH FoDHAM INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 358; see e.g. Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
25 See British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] Ch. 19 (affirming
injunction of lower court, [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.), against compliance with U.S. antitrust
decree which ordered I.C.I. not to assert certain British patent rights; decree was "intrusion" on
British sovereignty).
26 1980, c. 11, § 6.
27 For a discussion of blocking statutes, see HAwK, supra note 5, at 315-43. For a discussion
of protests of foreign nations, see K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
45 (1958); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE (To-
kyo) 565-92 (1964) (compilation by G.W. Haight of various protests); Commonwealth Nations
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hand, West Germany and Austria explicitly provide for "effects" juris-
diction in their antitrust laws and seem to have no objection to ours.28
Moreover, the Commission of the European Communities has en-
dorsed the effects doctrine for application of the Rome Treaty antitrust
provisions." 9 Ironically, while the United Kingdom objects to U.S. an-
titrust extraterritoriality, and previously objected also to EEC use of
the effects doctrine prior to British entry into the Common Market, it
now-like it or not--enjoys the protection of the doctrine by virtue of
membership in the EEC.
The effects doctrine substantively and procedurally raises
problems both of international relations and of impact on American
business abroad, and is thus central to questions of possible injury to
American business. But it is difficult to conceive of either the United
States or the EEC rejecting the doctrine. The relevant markets of anti-
trust concern are not neatly arranged according to national boundaries.
A nation seeking an effective antitrust policy must be concerned with
restrictive activities off-shore which interfere with its own economy and
society.
Study may be addressed more profitably to possible limitations on
the doctrine than to its validity in the abstract. Neither Section 18 of
the Restatement nor the Department of Justice Antitrust Guide require
proof of actual intent on the part of a foreign combination to affect
U.S. commerce,30 whereas intent was a part of Judge Learned Hand's
formula.3' Contrariwise, Judge Hand was willing to presume the nec-
Adopt Resolution Criticizing U.S. Treble Damage Judgments, 963 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), at A-10 (May 8, 1980).
28 Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I
1080, § 98(2) (W. Ger.) as republished Apr. 4, 1974, [1974] BGBI I 869, amended Law of June 28,
1976, [1976] BGB1 I 917, reprinted in 3 OECD GUIDE, supra note 6, at West Germany § 2.0;
Federal Act of 22 November 1972 on Rules Concerning Cartels and Provisions Designed to Pre-
serve the Freedom of Competition, § 4 (Austria), reprinted in 1 OECD GUIDE, supra note 6, at
Austria § 1.0. For a discussion of German attitudes, see Stockmann, Antitrust in the Federal Re-
public ofGermany, in FIFTH FORDHAM ANTITRUST, supra note 19, at 392. Recently, relying on
the "effects" doctrine, the German Federal Cartel Office issued a decision barring an acquisition
by a Germany company's French subsidiary, Bayer France, of another French company, Fire-
stone France. 480 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) (Euro-Market News), at 3 (Oct. 30, 1980), rev'd on
proceduralgrounds id at 4 (W. Berlin App. Ct. Dec. 16, 1980).
29 COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 31
(1977); HAWK, supra note 5, at 455.
30 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE] asserts
jurisdiction over foreign transactions if they have a "substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce."
31 Acts abroad were unlawful if "intended to affect imports and did affect them." United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
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essary effect on U.S. commerce from the intent, rather than put the
plaintiff to strict proof.3" Also doubt exists as to whether the effect must
be really "adverse" as distinguished from simply "substantial.
33
Consideration could be given to a statutory change requiring proof
of both intent and substantial adverse effect on the price, the supply or
some other significant market factor where the activity occurs abroad.
Also, American firms and their foreign subsidiaries, unlike purely for-
eign enterprises, probably do not enjoy the benefit of the Alcoa rule
requiring proof of intent when acting abroad, but perhaps should have
this differentiation removed. Such changes would limit jurisdiction to
cases where conduct is deliberate and especially culpable and effects
are sufficiently objectionable to make a strong case for extraterritorial
applicability. This approach might be more fair and less injurious to
both American and foreign firms in their activities abroad, without sac-
rificing clear American interests. It would not remove all the objections
of foreign governments, but it might reduce them.
In the example given, it is assumed that the United Kingdom's
antitrust laws would not come to the aid of the United States. Let us
suppose that the situation were reversed, and that the highly objection-
able cartel is composed of Americans who conspire in New York to
raise the price in exports to the United Kingdom. While the British
presumably would not like this, they could do nothing under their anti-
trust laws to stop it, if they applied their own principles against extra-
territoriality. I assume that for the same reason they would not urge
the EEC Commission to act.
But would American law be applicable?34 If so, in another para-
32 After proof of intent, the burden of proving lack of effect on imports shifted to defendant.
Id at 444.
33 With respect to the interstate commerce requirement of the Rome Treaty antitrust provi-
sions, the European Common Market Commission applies a test amounting to one of abnormal
effect, rather than adverse effect. A restrictive agreement causing a "considerable increase" in
trade could be brought within the requirement. Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundig-
Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, [1967 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 91 8046, at
7652 (E.C. Ct. of Justice 1966).
34 The Sherman Act unquestionably applies to export restraints. HAwK, supra note 5, at 45;
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 n.1 1 (1978). The cartel might register
with the Federal Trade Commission and try to come within the exemption for export trade as-
sociations under the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976). If the cartel oper-
ates exclusively in export trade, avoids any restrictive effect on competition within the United
States and does not artificially raise or depress prices in the United States, it may gain exemption
under section 2. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976). In 1978, only twenty-seven active associations were regis-
tered, and available data indicates that as of 1976, exempt associations accounted for only 1.5% of
total U.S. exports. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS
LATER 6, 15 (1978) (staff analysis).
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dox of this field, suits would be permitted in American courts by British
citizens. Even the British Government, if it is an injured party, could
use our courts to sue, for treble damages and an injunction 35 (although
the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act might allow the U.S. de-
fendants to go to Britain and "claw back" the punitive damages).
The United States Government itself could certainly seek to apply
the Sherman Act, because the restraint of trade would be carried out in
U.S. export commerce. Justice Department officials, however, have re-
cently argued that the Act should not apply in such a case, saying that
it is not designed to protect foreigners in foreign markets. 6 Foreign
nations should protect themselves, it is said, and they can use their own
laws against such a combination. It will be recalled, however, that the
Department in 1977 said that we would not attack foreign export car-
tels if they were like our Webb-Pomerene associations.37 Most foreign
nations follow the same policy. The result is a kind of paralysis al-
lowing export cartels to operate freely in both our import and our ex-
port trade. This situation certainly requires study.
To treat the question as simply an issue of "protection of foreign-
ers in foreign markets" is erroneous, however, because it ignores the
basic policy on which American antitrust laws is based 3 8-- that compe-
tition is the desired system for the economic activity regulated by Con-
gress. In the foreign commerce clause of the Sherman Act, Congress
clearly extended jurisdiction to restraints of competition and monopoli-
zation carried out in export, as well as import trade. The competitive
35 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
36 HAWK, supra note 5, at 45-52. In a paper entitled Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U.S. Ex-
port Trade, delivered before the American Society of International Law on April 23, 1977, Doug-
las E. Rosenthal, then Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division, argued
that "as a matter of law, restraints in U.S. export trade which only injure persons in foreign mar-
kets may not be made subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts." HAWK, supra, at 49; see Rosen-
thal, An Overview of The Guide and Its Objectives, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note I, at 85-87, 146.
Earlier, Donald I. Baker, then Deputy Assistant and later Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, said this is not an issue of jurisdiction, but argued strongly that as a matter
of "substance," the Sherman Act should apply only to restraints which have impact on the U.S.
domestic market or which restrict export opportunities of U.S. exporters. Baker, Antitrust and
World Trade- Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL IN'rL L.J. 16, 32-38 (1974). The
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 4-6 adopts this approach as a matter of
enforcement policy.
37 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
38 As a matter of current debate, this controversy originated with Mr. Baker's criticism of a
paper that I delivered before the Corporate Counsel Institute at Northwestern University Law
School, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered? (Oct. 3, 1973), reprinted in
8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974). Baker, note 36 supra. See also my Rejoinder to Mr. Baker, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 42 (1974); also my article, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American
Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 526 (1974).
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process is protected for its own value, not for the benefit of selected
groups of persons. Those who argue for a more limited, protectionist
interpretation do not explain how they justify a rationale which would
give jurisdiction, for example, over an exclusive dealing agreement
with a foreign distributor because it cuts off an outlet for a U.S. ex-
porter, but would deny jurisdiction over a boycott or a price-fixing
combination by all U.S. exporters because these would injure no U.S.
competitors or domestic consumers.
To say that there isjurisdiction, however, is not to say that there is
a violation; this would be a complete non-sequitur. In another article in
this issue, Douglas Rosenthal, former Chief of the Foreign Commerce
Section of the Antitrust Division, states my analysis correctly while in-
dicating that "[m]ost antitrust scholars" (unnamed) would not agree
with it, at least as to foreign joint ventures.39 He adds that "others"
(also unnamed), however, might apply the Sherman Act to find liability
from the mere fact of jurisdiction alone, and implies that the latter, if
not I, would therefore question the legality of a foreign joint venture,
which was cleared by the Department of Justice, to construct a large
hydroelectric project abroad. I strongly disagree with any inference, if
intended, that my analysis supports such a conclusion. If there is sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction in the example he gives, which depends upon
facts not stated, there is still the decisive question of whether the sub-
stantive law would invalidate the venture. In my opinion, even if the
parties are potential competitors, there would be no violation if they
would not be able or willing to undertake the project alone or in a less
restrictive way.
This "foreign markets" issue needs careful examination. It is not
one in which our international relations are heavily involved, but it is
important to the question of whether antitrust injures more than it ben-
efits American interests. Does antitrust as it may apply in export trade
injure that trade more than it stimulates it? Does it unduly deter Amer-
ican competition and investment abroad? Are limited exemptions
needed, such as in the Webb-Pomerene Act and the proposed Export
Trading Company Act?'4
Account should be taken of the unequal impact of the laws of dif-
39 Rosenthal, What Should be the Agenda of a Presidential Commission to Study the Interna-
tional,4pplication of U.S. Antitrust Law? 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 372, 379 (1980).
40 At this writing, an "Export Trading Company" bill, S. 2718, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 126
CONG. REC. S 1,935 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1980), has passed the Senate and is pending in the House
of Representatives. The bill and a similar House bill, H.R. 7230, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980),
would give the Secretary of Commerce power to grant antitrust exemptions to export associations
and export trading companies. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1151, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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ferent nations. As with the United Kingdom, most nations and the
EEC, however strict their antitrust laws may be domestically, do not
apply their laws to export cartels,4 just as we permit those registered
under Webb-Pomerene to enjoy exemption.42 Only a tiny number of
our exporting firms use the Webb-Pomerene exemption, and currently
it covers only about 1.5% of our total export activity,43 but in some
other nations, export cartels flourish.
If the United States applies its law to an export combination, or to
an activity abroad which may affect our foreign commerce, and if the
result is to prohibit the combination, it is possible that combinations
from other countries which do not extend antitrust rules to their foreign
commerce, or which have no such rules anyway, may have an advan-
tage. It remains to be seen whether this is a serious problem in actual
practice, and the study should focus on that question.
Other problems arise from this "foreign markets" jurisdiction. In
theory, the Act could be applied to various kinds of vertical agreements
with distributors abroad, such as resale price maintenance, exclusive
dealing, and tying, even in the absence of effects on imports or on the
domestic economy." It could apply where these practices are carried
out in the course of export commerce, or where they have a substantial
effect on it, as is doubtless the case sometimes. Whether the result
would be illegality would still depend upon the substantive rules of law
to be applied. Similar analysis brings some licensing arrangements,
joint ventures, consortia, acquisitions and other activities within the
scope of the Act.
To describe this as the "scope" of the Act is neither to say that this
is as it should be, nor that the activities covered are illegal. It is simply
a matter of realistic application of language, case law, and ordinary
legal theory. A sensible study cannot be conducted without objective
appraisal of the law's impact as it actually is, and the actuality is that
legal advisors today cannot afford to ignore the different theories out-
lined above.45
Congress could solve most of this by the radical step of simply
repealing the foreign commerce clause of the Act. This would put U.S.
law on a par with most other nations' antitrust laws, which apply to
41 See notes 7 and 8 supra.
42 Note 34 supra.
43 Note 34 supra.
44 I have discussed this in Rahl, InternationalApplication of United States Antitrust Laws: Dis-
tribution Arrangements, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, FIRsT ANNUAL FoRDHAm CORPORATE
LAW INsTrruTE 17 (B. Hawk ed. 1975).
45 See S. 1010 Hearings, supra note 1, at 66 (statement of W.F. Kennedy).
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restraints in their domestic markets, sometimes with extraterritorial ap-
plication, but have no express "foreign commerce" language. As a pol-
icy decision, this would be highly questionable. It probably could be
done without catastrophic consequences,' but something would be
lost. Through the interstate commerce clause, and the effects doctrine,
the law would still provide protection against most of the serious re-
straints because most of them have effects on the U.S. domestic econ-
omy. I would not favor this change, however.
A more sensible approach would be to consider carefully what, if
any, harms are now occurring which overbalance the benefits of the
present scope of the law. If a negative balance is clear, an amendment
could be considered to provide that a restraint confined to export trade
would not be a violation absent proof of a substantial, adverse effect on
U.S. commerce, as well as the usual proof of a substantive violation.
This would eliminate jurisdiction based on the "in" commerce theory,
and would also require a showing of adverse effect. It would probably
not be wise, however, to add an intent requirement here.
Substantive Rules of Law
It is often argued that per se rules should not be as frequently ap-
plied in foreign commerce cases as in domestic cases, and that reasona-
bleness tests should be given greater sway.4 7 The Department of
Justice Guide gives some general support to this idea, but as a concrete
matter takes little away from the present-day force of per se rules.4 8
The proposition is more easily said than implemented. Of the four ba-
sic per se rules, two-price-fixing and market allocation-are probably
so sound as applied in horizontal cases that it would be difficult to
make a good case for changing them. The whole presently successful
struggle against great international cartels could thereby be lost. The
one major qualification might be that genuinely "ancillary" restraints
46 The INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE'S concern for protecting export opportunities of
U.S. exporters could be preserved with new language limited to that. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
GUIDE, note 30 supra.
47 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 80-83 (1955). See also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST
LAWS AND PROCEDURES, 2 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 309 (1979)
(attachment C to Report of the Business Advisory Panel on Antitrust Export Issues) (separate
statement of Beshar, Dabney, Kennedy, and Valenti), suggesting that the rule of reason should
embrace consideration of meeting foreign competition in our home market, and competing effec-
tively with foreign-based enterprises in world markets.
48 The INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 2, says that the rule of reason
may have a broader application in some international situations, but id at 3 emphasizes that
normal per se rules will apply to horizontal price and market division restraints.
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should be given a greater reasonableness analysis.4 9 The Supreme
Court seems to be heading in that direction anyway, however, and it
would probably be better to leave this delicate problem to them.
Insofar as vertical restraints are concerned, the Court has aban-
doned a per se rule as to territorial restriction of distributors, 50 leaving
only resale price maintenance and tying arrangements in the per se cat-
egory. The former is perhaps best left there. The latter is undergoing
continuing erosion in the courts, and I would recommend allowing this
process to continue without interference.
The per se rule against boycotts certainly needs restatement gener-
ally, but it does not seem to be a frequent problem in international
commerce, apart from the Arab boycott, which has been dealt with by
separate legislation.5
Other substantive questions could be considered, such as the law
applied to mergers, joint ventures and consortia abroad.52 Section 7 of
the Clayton Act has no applicability where there are no effects on com-
petition in a "section of the country" (U.S.), as the statute requires.
That is probably as it should be. It is occasionally argued, however,
that even the more lenient Sherman Act tests which apply to these
transactions deter some valuable transactions. This is another instance
in which a somewhat broadened allowance for reasonably ancillary re-
straints would substantially reduce the problem, but it is not clear that
this should be accomplished by legislation. Judicial interpretation may
well move in that direction.
Joint ventures and mergers which adversely affect competition in
the U.S. domestic economy are, of course, another matter. Although
these sometimes involve foreign parties, they are problems which must
be dealt with in the same way as other domestic activities.
Licensing of industrial property is another important area in
which substantive law rules may, if not carefully shaped, operate to
deter valuable transactions.53 One of the greatest concerns to a pro-
spective American licensor may be whether the licensee can be pre-
49 The INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, note 30 supra, supports this, using as an example
territorial limitations of know-how licenses. Id at 3, 34.
50 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), changes the rule ex-
pounded in the INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 48-49.
51 Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, §§ 201-205, 91 Stat. 244 (1977) (amending the
Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub.L.No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969)) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
2402-03, 2405-07, 2410 (1980)).
52 See generally HAWK, supra note 5, at 241-307; INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra
note 30, at 15, 19, 28.
53 See text accompanying notes 62-69 infra.
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vented from using licensed technology to compete with the licensor in
geographic areas or fields of use in which the licensor is operating. In
some cases, the licensor will be unwilling to grant a license unless a
restrictive license provision is allowable. In the area of unpatented
know-how, the Department of Justice Antitrust Guide endorses the use
of the ancillary restraints doctrine to allow for such restrictions in de-
monstrably reasonable cases. 4 Where patents are concerned, however,
stricter rules are applied, and it would be desirable to study the practi-
cal impact of this distinction. Other questions in the industrial prop-
erty area also would warrant examination.
Legislative revision of substantive rules is a controversial and diffi-
cult task. In some instances it may be more productive of desirable
change to recommend revision of judicial and administrative interpre-
tation and policy rather than statutory amendment.
ANALYSIS OF INJURY AND BENEFIT
The contention often made that American business is injured in
foreign operations by the antitrust laws and that American interests
therefore suffer raises complex issues. A cost-benefit analysis is needed;
injury should be balanced with benefit before policy is decided. I sug-
gest that the subject be broken down into the following questions:
What is Meant by "Injury'?
A firm may think that whenever it is prevented from pursuing a
specific course of action, this interference with its freedom is itself inju-
rious, but the analysis should go further than the philosophical. Does
the firm have workable alternative courses of action? Business judg-
ment and legal counseling solve most antitrust problems by working
out lawful adjustments. A firm probably should not be considered to
be injured unless antitrust law either prevents a profitable operation
entirely with no reasonable alternative, thereby having a prohibitive
effect, or at least substantially reduces its profitability, having a disad-
vantageous effect.
By way of example, if a firm wishes to join an international cartel
but is advised that this would violate the Sherman Act, it is not "in-
jured" if it can stay out of the cartel and still suffer no significant busi-
ness disadvantage. The mere fact that its foreign competitors may
belong does not itself show injury. On the other hand, if the cartel
controls access to or success in the market in some way and there is no
54 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3, 34.
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way around this barrier, the firm is injured, unless it can effectively
change the situation, for example, by inducing antitrust authorities, ei-
ther U.S. or foreign, to take helpful action. The latter approach occurs
occasionally." Often, however, the firm will not wish to incur the cost,
delay and unpleasantness of taking or inducing legal action against
competitors.
In the example given, if membership in the cartel is compelled by
a foreign government, the firm may be legally secure in joining, but this
conclusion depends upon some rather complex legal analysis and in-
volves certain risks. 6 If membership is encouraged but not required by
a foreign government, legal security is probably absent.
Other situations may be more involved. Suppose that an Ameri-
can exporter wishes to enter into a distribution arrangement abroad
with an agreement which will prevent the foreign distributor from re-
selling back into the United States market in competition with the
American firm. Present doctrine requires a "rule of reason" analysis to
determine the legality of this arrangement,57 which adds uncertainty.
But if the exporter decides to abandon the restriction because of the law
and allow competition by the distributor, is the firm thereby "injured"
if its domestic sales are reduced, but still profitable? The question is
different from one involving outright foreclosure of access to a foreign
market. Here the injury complained of would be that produced by
competition in the U.S. domestic market, and it can be argued that this
is not a cognizable injury because of our basic domestic competition
policy.
But suppose that the firm's honest business judgment is that such
competition would be so costly as to make it simply unwilling to sell to
the foreign distributor without some restriction? If the law would make
this illegal (I repeat, it may not), the proposed exports may be pre-
vented entirely-unless of course the exporter can adopt an alternative
means of selling abroad. If it can, but at higher cost, is this "injury"?
A frequent complaint is that foreign competitors in foreign mar-
kets sometimes have an advantage because they do not have to comply
with antitrust laws which are as strict as those of the United States. An
attempt should be made to determine the frequency of prohibitive or
55 Both American and foreign antitrust enforcement agencies receive and investigate com-
plaints. In the EEC, Reg. 17, Art. 3, 2(b) makes provision for persons, who claim a "legitimate
interest" to apply for action by the Commission. 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
56 See text accompanying note 106-07 infra.
57 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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disadvantageous effects caused by such legal imbalances.5" This, of
course, is not a simple matter. One must understand in each instance
what the actual applicable foreign law is. It may or may not be as strict
as American law.59
One must also look closely at the question of whether U.S. anti-
trust law applies jurisdictionally,6 ° and if it does, whether substantive
antitrust law will prohibit what other laws will permit. There is a habit
of exaggerating the actual reach of American law on the part of some
who object to its extraterritoriality.
An exaggerated view is also encouraged by the practice in com-
mercial discussions of giving U.S. antitrust laws as an excuse for not
agreeing to something which a party really does not wish to do for busi-
ness reasons. I have seen instances in which American firms abroad
were asked to participate in cartel activity which they wished to avoid
because the cartel would restrict their markets and sales. The U.S. an-
titrust laws were given as a convenient reason for not participating,
rather than business considerations, thereby avoiding giving offense to
foreign sensibilities. In some of these cases, American law would not
apply.
Application of American law when it does occur, however, is not
always injurious; indeed, it may be helpful. There are situations in
which the American law prevents, or assists in preventing, American
firms from entering into arrangements abroad which would limit their
sales. Most horizontal cartels do that-they allocate markets and cus-
tomers and often also fix prices. Such restrictions impede business ex-
pansion far more often than they encourage it. By staying out of such
cartels, American firms have often been able to expand their sales
abroad.
But this is not to say that there are no truly injurious situations.
The possibilities are greatest with respect to "third country" markets
where U.S. law might apply because of the Sherman Act's foreign com-
merce clause, with no corresponding foreign law being applicable be-
cause of lack of a foreign commerce clause in foreign antitrust laws.6'
58 Analysis of differences and of overlap and conflict between U.S. and European antitrust
laws as to different kinds of business activities is offered in Rahl, supra note 5, at 148-310.
59 See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra.
60 See text accompanying notes 5-46 supra.
61 American firms interested in large engineering and construction projects in third coun-
tries may encounter handicaps in engaging m some forms of cooperation on these projects
which their European competitors are free to use. As the EEC Dutch Engineers case [[1967
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 2412.31, [1965] 4 COMM. MKT. L.R. 50] shows,
consortia to pool capital and personnel and share the costs, risks, and profits of large projects




Certain types of transactions are often mentioned as ones in which
valuable activity is sometimes discouraged or prevented, depending
upon a judgment as to whether American law will apply, and how.
These include joint ventures and consortia to operate abroad, distribu-
tion arrangements in foreign markets, export associations and trading
companies, and foreign licensing of industrial property.
Although the Justice Department almost never attacks a joint ven-
ture or consortium formed to do business abroad, there are operating
restrictions which some of the parties often want that may produce gen-
uine antitrust problems. For example, the participants may be unwill-
ing to invest capital in the joint venture if it will be free to sell in their
own home markets, or to furnish important supplies to their competi-
tors. Covenants not to compete to protect against these risks are a nat-
ural desire, but their legal status is often doubtful and pursuing the
legally safe course may make the whole deal unattractive.
Such cases should be carefully studied, preferably with the aid of
empirical information as suggested below.
Measuring Types and Extent of Injury
Before policy conclusions are drawn, judgments must be made as
to the frequency and practical importance of injuries to foreign busi-
ness opportunities caused by American antitrust. Obtaining such infor-
mation is difficult for a variety of reasons, but it should not be
considered impossible. Recently I supervised a project at Northwestern
in which Joel A. Bleeke, a senior law student, sought to determine em-
pirically the impact on licensing of unpatented know-how caused by
U.S., EEC, and developing-country rules regulating territorial and
field-of-use restrictions.62 Research in secondary sources yielded little
information, except to help to refine the issues. A questionnaire was
developed in consultation with business lawyers and executives. Under
a guarantee of confidentiality, licensing attorneys or executives of fifty-
EEC. Moreover, the Commission's policy statement on permissible cooperation indicates
that such arrangements may fall outside Article 85(1) even though they affect domestic com-
petition, if the participants would be unable to carry out the job individually. The same
statement also reminds firms that an Article 85(3) exemption may still be available, even if
Article 85(1) applies.
Consortia of this kind normally require agreement upon prices and allocation of shares
in the job, and American law would therefore impose certain risks of violation upon firms
forming them, although they may be lawful under some circumstances. If American firms
wishing to undertake jobs of this sort decide for legal reasons that they must operate unilater-
ally, and if the costs and risks would be too great for single-firm operation, the imbalance in
American and European law would produce prohibitive consequences for Americans.
Rahl, npra note 5, at 164-65.
62 Bleeke & Rahl, The Value of Territorial and Field-of-Use Restrictions in the International
Licensing of Unpatented Know-How: An Empirical Study, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 450 (1979).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:336(1980)
three major American companies63 responded. The results strongly in-
dicated that foreign licensing of unpatented know-how by U.S. firms
would be significantly diminished were it not for the fact that U.S. law
permits some restrictions on licensees abroad for a "reasonable" period
of time against export to the United States of products embodying the
know-how. 64 The study also indicated that a greater time than the "re-
verse engineering" period now suggested by the Justice Department is
needed for adequate protection of licensors. American firms, the
study found, consider territorial protection in such licenses to be more
important than field-of-use restrictions, but prohibitions of the latter
also would affect licensing by a substantial number of firms.66
The study also produced fairly clear answers to questions concern-
ing foreign laws. Policies against territorial restrictions in know-how
licensing within the European Economic Community have not signifi-
cantly affected licensing into the EEC by American firms.67 On the
other hand, license registration laws in Latin American countries and
India appear to have had a major adverse effect on technology flows
from the United States to those countries.68
Although this study did not fully examine alternatives pursued by
firms where antitrust rules have had a "prohibitive" effect on licens-
ing,69 this could be done where the subject matter calls for it. The
study, by two persons devoting much less than full time to it, required
about a year. Gaining the necessary background to ask the right ques-
tions, formulating questions, obtaining answers and collating and ana-
lyzing results were all very time-consuming. But such an approach can
provide better information and guidance for policy than simply ob-
taining general opinions by testimony. Several such studies could en-
hance the value of a national commission's work in this area.
Balancing Benefits and Injuries
Benefits in individual business situations have been illustrated, but
there are broader values to be considered. The main point to antitrust
policy is "faith in the value of competition,"7 not protection of either
63 Mailings were sent to 196 American companies. Id at 456.
64 Id at 458-64, 482.
65 Id at 464-68, 482.
66 Id at 477-80.
67 Id at 468-71, 483.
68 Id at 471-77, 483.
69 Manufacture abroad and export, of course, are sometimes alternatives to licensing.




particular businesses or consumers. In the Sherman Act, Congress has
dictated that our international commerce should be conducted accord-
ing to that faith, on the theory that this will provide the best environ-
ment for such commerce and best serve the interests of our society.
These are long-run considerations which cannot be tested alone in
terms of complaints of individual injury; competition frequently
arouses opposition. Nor can they be tested alone by reference to short-
term shifts in the balance of trade.
Perspective may be gained by asking what would happen were we
to repeal the antitrust laws entirely, or arrange that they are to have no
application to any matters of foreign commerce. History strongly sug-
gests that before long a great deal of American foreign trade and in-
vestment would fall into the hands of cartels who would allocate
markets and quotas, determine prices and production policies, and seek
to control who might engage in the business. In some cases, monopo-
lies would result.
With American antitrust gone, foreign antitrust law would have
difficulty surviving. If our firms can now argue that weaker law abroad
should justify weakening our own laws, imagine the argument which
foreign firms could make if the tables were turned! In any event pri-
vate international cartels would certainly thrive with no American law
to prevent American firms from participating in them.
A study of international cartels which I completed last year found,
from published sources alone, that immediately prior to World War II,
international cartels controlled from 30% to 50% of world trade.71 A
Justice Department study supervised by Corwin Edwards noted, as the
war began, existence of 179 international cartels, with American par-
ticipants in 109 of them."2
Several factors contributed to the post-war demise of these cartels,
but no factor had such a direct bearing as did enforcement of the
American antitrust laws. Global cartels can seldom operate without
applying controls to the huge American market, nor can they succeed
in controlling other markets if American firms are free to compete in
them.73 Between 1940 and 1949, about 60 antitrust cases involving in-
ternational cartels were filed by the Justice Department. 74 As Ameri-
can firms left the cartels and as foreign firms whose cartel activities had
71 International Cartels and Their Regulation (paper to be published in proceedings of Co-
lumbia University Conference on International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices, held
at Airlie House, Virgnia, Nov. 9-10, 1979) (manuscript in author's file).
72 Id at 8.
73 Id at 20-22.
74 Id at 22.
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affected American markets also dropped out or curtailed their restric-
tions, the big cartels literally fell apart. The whole climate of interna-
tional business changed. With it, American foreign trade and
investment underwent great expansion, an expansion which is continu-
ing though perhaps slowing in pace.
It is unlikely that a return to cartelization in world trade would be
advantageous to American business or to the American public. A liv-
ing example of the problems this would create is provided by today's
foreign-government operated or protected cartels, principally in raw
materials such as oil. These are only a sample of what could happen if
private cartels were again free to operate.
Few would argue now for wholesale abandonment of what has
thus proved to be an extremely valuable American policy, one that is
steadily growing among the nations. Proposals for change tend to be
more in the direction of curtailing the outer scope of American law,
loosening some of its substantive prohibitions, and providing limited
exemptions for some activities. In considering these proposals, one
should always ask whether the injury can be cured without too much
damage to the broader values. Finely-tuned changes may be possible.
But history argues that we must proceed with great care.
The story of the Webb-Pomerene exemption of 1918 for export
trade associations is instructive.75 One of the very few exemptions ever
arranged for non-regulated businesses, it allows restraints of trade by
associations registered under the Act and engaging exclusively in ex-
port trade, provided there is no adverse effect on competition or prices
in the U.S. domestic market.76 As stated above, it has been little-used,
and is at low ebb today; there are less than 30 such associations, ac-
counting for only 1.5% of U.S. exports.77 Strict application of the Sher-
man Act to activities falling outside the scope of the exemption is often
given as one of the main reasons for non-use.78 What this refers to is
that domestic restraints or "spillovers" are prosecuted, that exempt as-
sociations may not have foreign members (i e., may not join or become
"international" cartels), and that parties may not agree to curtail export
75 Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976); FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW
(1967); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERENE AssoCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER
(1978) (staff analysis submitted to FTC); HAWK, supra note 5, at 96-109; FUGATE, supra note 5, at
223-54. See Ongman, Is Somebody Crying "Wolf'"? An Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes
Export Trade, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1979).
76 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 61-65 (1976).
77 Note 34 supra.
78 Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act: Some New Developments in a Quiescent History, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 341, 352-53 (1968).
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activities in favor of foreign joint ventures or other investments. 9
Webb-Pomerene should be studied by Congress, as the National
Commission recommended.8" Its lesson may be that exemptions of this
kind from the Sherman Act, intended to promote the formation of ex-
port associations and trading companies, will not be popular unless
some restraints of competition in the domestic market are allowed and
some cooperation with foreign cartels is permitted. Is that a price we
wish to pay?
Similar questions should be considered in balancing pros and cons
on any proposed changes in the law.
LAWS AND POLICIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Foreign nations, individually and sometimes also through interna-
tional organizations, often have antitrust laws of their own. These
sometimes have greater impact on American business activities abroad
than American law, and must be taken into account in any serious
study of injury due to antitrust. Foreign governments also sometimes
have interests which conflict with American antitrust policy, and occa-
sionally take actions which positively interfere, and this too must be
considered.
Foreign Antitrust Laws
One hears with amazing frequency that antitrust laws reflect tech-
niques of the 19th Century and should be abolished or greatly cur-
tailed.81 As a description of domestic law this claim is uninformed, and
is outlandish in light of recent actions in many parts of the world. An-
titrust policy has been growing recently by leaps and bounds in the free
world, and almost every judgment about international policy in this
area must take account of this.
Since World War II, over 20 nations comprising most of the devel-
oped countries have enacted laws to control restrictive trade practices,
cartels, and abuses of dominant power.8 2 In the midst of the current
objections by the United Kingdom to some American antitrust actions
affecting British firms, one might miss the fact that that nation, begin-
ning in 1948, has adopted eight major antitrust statutes, including the
79 Id at 346-48.
80 2 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 47, at 295.
81 E.g. L. Thurow, Let's Abolish theAntitrust Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 3, at 2, col. 3;
see letters replying to this article, id, Nov. 2, 1980, § 3, at 2, col. 5.
82 Davidow, InternationalAntitrust Codes of Conduct: A Progress Report, in FIFTH FORDHAM
ANTITRUST, supra note 19, at 405, 408.
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Competition Act of 1980 sponsored by the Thatcher Government now
in power.13 Together, these laws give the United Kingdom a system of
antitrust measures which are almost as comprehensive as the American
laws, although the remedies are not always as strict.
West Germany has a fairly strong antitrust law, adopted in 1956,
that has recently been amended to increase controls over mergers,
along with continued strict treatment of cartels and other restrictive ar-
rangements.8 4 France also has a substantial set of laws, which have
recently been strengthened. 5 Although enforcement and interpreta-
tion of the French laws tend to be lenient, they are still of major signifi-
cance. Even Japan has a broad antitrust law, although for years it was
given only mild enforcement and in the foreign trade area it was rela-
tively ineffective. There are signs worth studying that Japanese anti-
trust is becoming more significant, however.16 Smaller developed
nations in Europe, as well as Canada, 7 have antitrust laws which are
less strict either in substance or as a practical matter than those already
mentioned, but which nonetheless represent increasing reliance upon a
policy favoring more competition. Many developing countries have re-
cently adopted such laws as well.88
Rivaling the U.S. antitrust laws in importance are those of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC), presently comprising nine mem-
ber nations including all the major powers of Western Europe, ie.,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and West Germany, along with
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. 9
Launched in 1957 by the Rome Treaty, the EEC has major antitrust
provisions modeled largely after the Sherman Antitrust Act and serving
as one of the cornerstones of development of the Common Market.
These laws substantially prohibit both horizontal and vertical agree-
ments in restraint of trade, subject to certain exemptions, and single-
firm abuses of dominant market positions anywhere in the area of the
Common Market are also prohibited if interstate commerce is affected.
The laws have been implemented by regulations, and numerous en-
83 1980, c. 21.
84 Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB] I
1080. § 98(2) (W. Ger.) as republished Apr. 4, 1974, [1974] BGBI 1 869, amended Law of June 28,
1976, [1976] BGBI I 917, reprinted in OECD GUIDE, supra note 6, at West Germany § 2.0.
85 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, [1978] 1 ANNUAL RE-
PORTS ON COMPETITIVE POLICY I OECD MEMBER CoUNTRIES 42.
86 Id at 61; [1979] 1 id at 51.
87 See generally OECD GUIDE, note 6 supra. On Canada, see Bertrand, Recent Developments
in Canadian Competition Law, in FIFTH FoRDHAM ANTITRUST, supra note 19, at 103.
88 Davidow, supra note 82, at 409.
89 HAWK, supra note 5, at 411-775.
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forcement actions and court decisions have established them as a major
matter to be reckoned with by all who do business in the Common
Market.
These laws are overlaid on the national laws of the member states
of the European Communities in much the same way that American
federal antitrust laws operate with reference to state laws in this coun-
try. Thus, Common Market antitrust law is part of the governing law
of each member nation, is binding on its citizens, is enforcible in its
courts, and is supreme over national law in cases of inconsistency. 90 In
considering what is the antitrust policy of Italy, which has no national
antitrust statute, and the United Kingdom, which has several laws, for
example, one must remember that both have the same supra-national
(Community) antitrust law, which provides a uniform antitrust policy
for a great many major transactions.
Inevitably, this large and growing number of national and regional
antitrust laws occasionally overlap. Enforcement of given laws often
affects business activity outside the jurisdiction of the particular nation.
Conversely, international business activities invariably affect more than
one nation, and where antitrust problems arise, more than one set of
laws becomes involved. Both cooperation and conflict are possible in
these circumstances. Within the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, of which the United States is a member, a pro-
cedure has been adopted to encourage consultation and cooperation
among the nations in such cases.91 OECD has also adopted guidelines
for multinational enterprises, which include provisions on avoidance of
restrictive practices and abuse of dominant power.9" In addition, the
United States has bilateral agreements for consultation with Canada,93
and West Germany, 94 and an informal working relationship with the
European Communities.
All bf this activity still falls far short of covering many parts of the
world, of course, and there is no truly world law on the subject. The
first successful steps toward eventual world law, however, are now be-
ing taken. Earlier post-World War II efforts to adopt an international
approach, principally the Havana Charter of 1948 and the United Na-
90 Id at 476-83.
91 Id at 808.
92 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 18-19 (rev. ed. 1979).
93 See Rahl, supra note 5, at 441-48.
94 Accord on Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Germany, 27 U.S.T.
1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprintedin 772 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-I (July 13,
1976).
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tions ECOSOC proposal of 1953, failed for lack of support by different
governments, including the United States.95
In May, 1980, however, many nations from all parts of the globe,
including developed, developing and Communist-bloc countries, after
years of meetings under United Nations auspices, agreed in Geneva to
support a set of "Equitable Principles and Rules for Control of Interna-
tional Restrictive Business Practices." '96 These principles and rules
state that enterprises should refrain from specified restrictive practices
and cartel arrangements in international trade, 97 and from abuses of a
dominant market position.98 Although the principles and rules are
"recommendations" to states and enterprises, are not "binding" either
95 Rahl, supra note 5, at 417-39.
96 The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restric-
tive Business Practices, - U.N. Conference on Trade and Development -, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/Conf/10 (1980).
97 3. Enterprises, except when dealing with each other in the context of an economic entity
wherein they are under common control, including through ownership, or otherwise not able
to act independently of each other, engaged on the market in rival or potentially rival activi-
ties, should refrain from practices such as the following when, through formal, informal,
written or unwritten agreements or arrangements, they limit access to markets or otherwise
unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on international
trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the economic development of these
countries: (a) agreements fixing prices including as to exports and imports; (b) collusive
tendering; (c) market or customer allocation arrangements; (d) allocation by quota as to sales
and production; (e) collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by concerted refusals to
deal; (f) concerted refusal of supplies to potential importers; (g) collective denial of access to
an arrangement, or association, which is crucial to competition.
Id § D(3).
98 4. Enterprises should refrain from the following acts or behaviour in a relevant market
when, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market power,
they limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely
to have adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and
on the economic development of these countries: (a) predatory behaviour towards competi-
tors, such as using below cost pricing to eliminate competitors; (b) discriminatory (i.e. unjusti-
fiably differentiated) pricing or terms or conditions in the supply or purchase of goods or
services, including by means of the use of pricing policies in transactions between affiliated
enterprises which overcharge or undercharge for goods or services purchased or supplied as
compared with prices for similar or comparable transactions outside the affiliated enterprises;
(c) mergers, takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control, whether of a horizontal,
vertical or a conglomerate nature; (d) fixing the prices at which goods exported can be resold
in importing countries; (e) restrictions on the importation of goods which have been legiti-
mately marked abroad with a trademark identical or similar to the trademark protected as to
identical or similar goods in the importing country where the trademarks in question are of
the same origin, i.e., belong to the same owner or are used by enterprises between which there
is economic, organizational, managerial or legal interdependence and where the purpose of
such restrictions is to maintain artificially high prices; (f) when not for ensuring the achieve-
ment of legitimate business purposes, such as quality, safety, adequate distribution or service:
(i) partial or complete refusals to deal on the enterprise's customary commercial terms; (ii)
making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the acceptance of restric-
tions on the distribution or manufacture of competing or other goods; (iii) imposing restric-
tions concerning where, or to whom, or in what form or quantities goods supplied or other
goods may be re-sold or exported; (iv) making the supply of particular goods or services




on the nations or on their subjects,9 9 and have no enforcement machin-
ery, they form a basis for consultation, persuasion, and action on the
part of nations and persons. Such first steps should not be ignored in
the United States, which has done more than any other nation to stand
for antitrust laws to support a free competitive enterprise system. At
this writing, efforts are continuing in the U.N. to adopt a code gov-
erning transfers of technology which also will contain provisions of an
antitrust nature.100
Treatment of the issues which the United States faces concerning
international antitrust policy must take account of this massive world-
wide movement toward more antitrust. Arguments for further Webb-
Pomerene type exemptions, for relaxation of antitrust rules because of
objections by a few foreign nations, and for the proposition that Ameri-
can business suffers a great disadvantage in competing abroad because
of our antitrust laws all are short of the mark unless they calculate the
effects of this much foreign and international antitrust development.
It would be equally wrong to intimate that the state of world anti-
trust law is anywhere near providing a uniform environment, however.
There is no escape from complex analysis of this multi-faceted area.
Foreign Non- and Anti-Anttrust Policies
The most difficult matter in this whole area is that of how to ap-
proach policies and actions of foreign nations which overlap and differ
with, clash with, and sometimes block American antitrust action. An
increasing amount of cartel-like activity is engaged in or sponsored by
foreign governments. 10 1 The United States on occasion acts in a simi-
lar way. Some foreign nations, as noted above, object to American en-
forcement efforts affecting their citizens and territory, and a few have
taken steps to interfere with such enforcement.
Diplomacy may solve some of these problems, and inter-govern-
mental arrangements such as provided by GATT, OECD and the
United Nations may help. But a number of direct legal issues arise
under American law itself with respect to the effect to be given to for-
eign actions and interests. Workable rules are needed, and in some
instances the state of the law is most unsatisfactory. The principal
problems are discussed below.
99 Id Annex.
100 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Draft International
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, - U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
-, U.N. Doc. TD/TOT/25 (1980).
101 International Cartels and Their Regulation, supra note 67, at 2-4, 35.
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Defense of Sovereign Immunity. Although suits against foreign
governments and their enterprises are relatively infrequent, they can be
troublesome when they occur. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 recognizes immunity, 0 2 but also codifies earlier practice in
making an exception for suits based upon a "commercial activity" of
the foreign nation. 103 Conduct abroad having "direct effect" in the
United States is included within the exception, thus providing recent
Congressional approval of the "effects" test of jurisdiction (without an
intent requirement)." °
As the dismissal of the private suit against the OPEC oil cartel last
year shows, 10 5 the commercial activity exception may be too simplistic.
Although the OPEC nations are engaging in what to purchasers cer-
tainly is the commercial activity of selling oil, the court found that the
exception to immunity should not apply because what is involved is
governmental control by these foreign nations over one of their princi-
pal natural resources. The court also held that foreign sovereigns may
not be made defendants in Sherman Act suits.
Antitrust law certainly is not designed to dictate policy to foreign
governments. But cartels are a plague in international commerce.
What approach will satisfy the imperatives of antitrust policy and at
the same time accommodate the realities of foreign relations?
Defenses of Act of State and Foreign Government Compulsion.
These related defenses may bar antitrust suits against private defend-
ants if the latter show that the conduct complained of is the result of
foreign state action.' 6 The theory may be that the conduct is actually
an "act of state" which cannot be questioned in American litigation, or
it may be that the foreign state has compelled private action and that
the defendant ought not to be held responsible for that.
These defenses have received judicial recognition. It is obvious
that they must have some qualifications, however. Thus, the Justice
Department Guide accepts applicability of the defenses for conduct in
102 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). See Comment, Suing a Foreign Government Under the United
States Antitrust Laws: The Need/or Clarocication of the CommercialActivity Exception to the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (1979).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defences:
Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1976), revised version 6 Swiss
REV. INT'L ANTITRUST L. 1 (1979).
104 Timberg, note 103 supra.
105 International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
106 HAwK, supra note 5, at 111; see Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A
Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
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the territory of the foreign state, but not for conduct in the United
States, while the status of acts in third countries is in doubt.° 7 Other
qualifications are mentioned in the Guide and are being developed in
the courts.
Two corollary questions of great importance merit study. One is
whether strong encouragement or persuasion by a foreign state which
falls short of provable compulsion should ever be given status as a de-
fense. Under present case law, it is not a defense, but the distinction is
somewhat dubious in some cases.
A second question is whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will
be recognized, i e. the principle of domestic antitrust law that inducing
a governmental body to take restrictive action is immune from antitrust
liability. 08 The Guide agrees that the doctrine should be allowed in
cases of communications with foreign sovereigns where the conduct is
genuine and not a "sham."'0 9 Some doubt arises because the domestic
doctrine is based on First Amendment freedom of petition principles
which our Constitution does not provide as to foreign governments.
Although the Constitutional explanation for the doctrine is popular,
based upon some language of Justice Black in the Noerr case, the main
point is simply that a private individual is not responsible under the
antitrust laws for the actions of a government. This is the same theory
that supports the "act of state" and "foreign government compulsion"
defenses themselves. It is both unrealistic and unsound to treat com-
munications made in reliance upon those defenses differently from the
acts giving rise to the defenses themselves.
Blocking andAnti-4n/i/rust Laws. A dilemma arises in connection
with the defenses last-mentioned above. A few foreign governments
have acted directly to prohibit compliance with our antitrust laws and
those of other nations. u0 The recent United Kingdom Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980 does that, and also provides that judg-
ment-debtors in American and other foreign treble damage suits may
recover ("claw back") the punitive portion of the damages in a U.K.
court."'
107 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 54.
108 Eastern RLtR Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); HAwK, supra note 5, at 144.
109 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 30, at 62-63.
110 For various laws, see HAwK, supra note 5, at 315-42.
111 1980, c. 11, §§ 6, 7. Australia has enacted a similar, but less drastic Foreign Antitrust Judg-
ments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979, No. 13 (Austl). Canada is considering such legisla-
tion. 973 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-19 (July 17, 1980).
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The dilemma is that these laws are acts of state and matters of
foreign government compulsion. Being largely carried out in the terri-
tory of the foreign nation, the laws would qualify as defenses under our
own rules. The British "claw back" provision evidently would apply to
judgments based upon illegal activity in the United States, however,
and thus might not meet requirements of the defense. It is difficult to
see how this provision could come up as a defense to an American
antitrust action anyway, unless the American plaintiff, having lost two-
thirds of his judgment in an English court, sues in the United States to
get it back. This could be a never-ending process.
Foreign blocking laws are often not implementations of policies
different from our own. The United Kingdom, Canada and Australia
all have antitrust laws which, though different in various ways, gener-
ally seek the same broad goals.11 2 The blocking statutes sometimes
seem to be more calculated to shelter activity which is illegal under
U.S. law than to carry out a positive policy. They most often operate to
interfere procedurally rather than substantively-to block investigation
and discovery, the obtaining of documentary evidence, the compelling
of testimony and the carrying out of judgments.
Present case law does not, and probably should not, accord these
laws the status of providing a full defense or immunity. 3 The rule on
production of evidence located abroad defers rather strongly to foreign
command, however, in that the party concerned may be excused if a
good faith effort has been made, though unsuccessful, to obtain foreign
government consent to comply with the American court order. "14 One
must sympathize with such a party, caught between opposing jaws of
sovereignty. But how can American policy be adequately protected
against the growing number of foreign laws which rely on our own
precepts of due process and then are specifically tailored to frustrate
American law?
The Comity Princile. Recently, several courts have endorsed the
use of a principle of international comity in cases involving extraterri-
torial application of American antitrust law, as a factor in determining
whether to assert or exercise subject matter jurisdiction." 5 Under this
112 See generally OECD GUIDE, note 6 supra.
113 See HAWK, supra note 5, at 321.
114 Id
115 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1977); Manning-
ton Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979); Dominicus Americana
Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., [1980] 2 TRADE CAS. 1 63,288 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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principle, the court will weigh the interests of American public policy
against a foreign nation's interests in accordance with a variety of fac-
tors-ten in number in the latest cases. So far the balance has yet to tip
in favor of dismissal, but this could be the result. The Supreme Court
has not as yet passed on this matter.
Comity is a laudable and indeed essential idea in international re-
lations. As a ground for outright dismissal of a cause of action other-
wise authorized by Congress, however, it gives rise to some problems.
First is the issue of legitimacy itself. Absent Congressional approval,
by what right may a court exercise such discretion? A verbal device is
sometimes used to support such judicial action, by calling this a "juris-
dictional rule of reason."' 6 The traditional rule of reason in antitrust
cases gives the courts a great deal of discretion. But that discretion is
exercised with reference to carrying out the policy of the Act in accord-
ance with a single standard-against undue or unreasonable restriction
of competition. The rule of reason is not a defense to otherwise illegal
conduct. But the comity doctrine would operate as such a defense, and
with numerous different criteria.
This raises the second question of whether a court can satisfacto-
rily administer such a test. 1 7 How can it adequately inform itself of
the nature of, and weight to be given to, foreign nation interests-a task
which our best-informed foreign relations agencies have difficulty
enough doing through more flexible non-judicial action?
Third, what procedures should be designed to implement such a
doctrine? Great difficulties will arise in connection with private suits,
where no party is likely to be qualified to reliably inform the court on
these questions. Should the United States and the foreign government
both be asked to appear? What if they do, but disagree? What if one
or both do not appear?
In antitrust suits filed by the Government, the problems may not
be as great. A responsible executive department will have made a de-
termination, presumably in consultation with the State Department,
See Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Coq.: A Further Step TowardA Complete Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 241 (1980). Letter of May 6, 1980 from Assoc.
Atty. Gen. John H. Shenefield to Judge Prentice H. Marshall, in Westinghouse, Inc. v. Rio Algom,
Ltd. (N.D. IIl.), [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,416.
116 E.., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1977). The
phrase was used in K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958) in
connection with factors to be considered by officials in deciding whether to prosecute, and by
judges in determining liability "within the limits of their discretion." Brewster did not analyze the
legal basis for such discretion.
117 See Blair, The Canadian Experience, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 71, asking "how it
is" that a judge "can decide what is the proper balance of international interests."
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that U.S. interests should prevail, and the foreign nation may be con-
sulted.
But private suits are sometimes awkward in the foreign commerce
area. Many of the modem cases in which the courts have been asked to
assert broad extraterritorial jurisdiction have been private actions.
Plaintiffs are not so concerned with the rightness of government poli-
cies or niceties of international relations as with winning. All of the
reported cases to date in which the comity principle has been endorsed
by the courts have been private suits, perhaps reflecting an exercise of
judicial caution against what may seem to be potentially extreme cause
of action theories." 18
It is sometimes suggested that for these reasons private litigation in
the foreign commerce area should be cut back. This would be a drastic
change, but it should probably be an area for study.
CONCLUSION
The topics suggested above are only a partial list. Almost any is-
sue known to antitrust has a foreign commerce aspect, and the interna-
tional setting adds many unique questions of its own.
A national commission for study of the problems of this area will
have to choose its topics judiciously to avoid seeming to over-empha-
size some things of importance to the neglect of others. Perhaps it
should announce at the outset an intention to deal with selected issues
and to recommend additional phases for study in the future according
to some time-table.
As I have suggested above, it would seem wise to commission a
number of studies of certain questions. These may include reference to
the best of the large literature. They might well also include empirical
projects to obtain more solid information than can be gained from
opinion testimony on such questions as the benefits and injuries of anti-
trust in different types of activity.
Few of these questions have a simple answer. In such circum-
stances, legislation may be the wrong approach. The commission may
find it better in some cases to make recommendations to the courts and
agencies, leaving much to their discretion. The Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws in the 1950's had a very
beneficial effect on development of the law through such an approach.
A few statutory changes may be worth considering, however, and some
possible areas for legislative action have been suggested above.
118 See note 115 supra.
